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Abstract
It is well known for the common multi-population evolutionary dynamics applied
to normal form games that a pure strategy combination is asymptotically stable if
and only if it is a strict equilibrium point. We extend this result to sets as follows.
For certain regular selection dynamics every connected and closed asymptotically
stable set of rest points containing a pure strategy combination is a strict equilibrium
set and hence a Nash equilibrium component. A converse statement holds for two
person games, for convex strict equilibrium sets and for the standard replicator
dynamic.
Keywords: evolutionary dynamics, replicator dynamic, regular selection dynamics,
strict equilibrium set, Nash equilibrium component.
JEL classi¯cation number: C79.
¤We like to thank Josef Hofbauer for helpful comments and suggestions.
yaddress: Department of Economics, University of Exeter, Streatham Court, Exeter EX4 4PU, U.K.,
e-mail: D.G.Balkenborg@exeter.ac.uk
zaddress: Economics Department, European University Institute, Via dei Roccettini 9, 50016 San
Domenico di Fiesole, Italy, e-mail: schlag@iue.it
11 Introduction
For the typical evolutionary dynamic of an asymmetric game a pure strategy combination
is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict equilibrium point. This observation
has been made repeatedly (see, for instance, Eshel and Akin (1983), Ritzberger and
Vogelsberger (1989), Samuelson and Zhang (1992) and Ritzberger and Weibull (1996)).
Many games, in particular extensive-form games, have components of Nash equilibria
rather than isolated equilibria. It is therefore important to investigate extentions of this
result to sets of strategies. Ritzberger and Weibull (1996) provide necessary and su±cient
condition for the asymptotic stability of faces. This is a weak selection criterion insofar as
the population state is allowed to change when starting within a face with this property.
In this paper we will consider evolutionary selection in a slightly narrower sense than
Ritzberger and Weibull (1996) and limit attention to asymptotic stable sets that consist
of rest points, i.e., where no movement takes place when the population state lies within
the set. At the same time, we will investigate sets more general than faces in order to get a
better understanding of the structural implications of the dynamic properties themselves.
In particular, we do not restrict attention to convex sets.
The relevant static equilibrium concept for our results is that of a strict equilibrium
set (short, SE set). Recall that a Nash equilibrium is called strict if every player strictly
loses by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium. Following Balkenborg (1994) a set
of Nash equilibria is called a strict equilibrium set (SE set) if for any equilibrium in the
set, a player either loses strictly by unilaterally deviating or if his deviation just leads
to another equilibrium in the set. More precisely, if the strategy of a single player in an
equilibrium belonging to the set is replaced with an alternative best reply of this player
another equilibrium in the set is obtained. Thus the set of Nash equilibria as a whole is
robust against deviations in the same sense as it is the case for a strict equilibrium.
We study multi-population evolutionary dynamics in normal form games. These nor-
mal form games are viewed as models for asymmetric evolutionary contests between as
many populations as there are players in the game.1 The individuals in each population
are assumed to play pure strategies. The dynamics governing the change in play are
in continuous time and have to be regular selection dynamics as de¯ned in Samuelson
and Zhang (1992) or Ritzberger and Weibull (1996). In particular, faces of the strategy
simplex have to be invariant. Intuitively, such dynamics model processes where only mu-
tation, not selection itself, can cause new strategies to be played. They have therefore
been extensively studied in the literature. However, many processes which assume more
rationality of the agents like the best response dynamics (see Hofbauer (1995b)), ¯ctitious
play or perturbed versions of these dynamics (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1998) and
Hopkins (1999)) are ruled out. In addition we require that the dynamic reinforces best
replies which consists of two conditions. (i) The growth rate of any best reply in a given
population is positive unless all strategies currently played in this population are already
best replies. (ii) When all strategies currently played in a population are best replies then
the growth rate of non-best replies is negative. Included are all payo® positive and payo®
monotonic dynamics, in particular the standard and the adjusted replicator dynamic, all
1In contrast, the classic concept of an ESS applies to settings where a symmetric game is played within
a single population.
2regular selection dynamics discussed in Nachbar (1990), all sophisticated imitation dy-
namics in Hofbauer and Schlag (2000) and many of the imitation dynamics considered in
Hofbauer (1995a) and Weibull (1995).
For such dynamics we show that every closed and connected asymptotically stable set
of rest points which contains at least one pure strategy combination must be a SE set.
For the standard replicator dynamic one can drop the assumption that the set contains
a pure strategy combination. However, for other dynamics this additional condition can
be crucial. For example, in Matching Pennies the singleton set containing the mixed
equilibrium is not a SE set but it is well known that it is asymptotically stable in the
adjusted replicator dynamics of Maynard Smith (1982).
We also obtain the converse statement (every SE set is an asymptotically stable set
of rest points) (i) if each element of the SE set is a best response to its best responses, or
(ii) if the underlying dynamic is the standard replicator dynamic. Condition (i) is always
satis¯ed in two-player games or when the SE set is convex. The result with condition (ii)
is due to Balkenborg (1994).
Summarizing, we obtain a tight characterization of connected asymptotically stable
sets of rest points that satisfy one of the following additional conditions: (a) the set is
convex and contains a pure strategy combination, (b) the set contains a pure strategy
combination and the game is between two players only, and (c) the underlying dynamic
is the standard replicator dynamic.
Our research complements that of Ritzberger and Weibull (1996). They show that a
face is asymptotically stable if and only if it is closed under better replies. To be closed
under better replies means that after replacing the strategy of one or several players by a
better reply to the current state the resulting state also belongs to the set. We show that
a convex SE set is a face that is closed under better replies. Thus we obtain a re¯ned
version of the characterization in Ritzberger and Weibull (1996) by adding the dynamic
property that the face contains only rest points and the static property that it consists of
Nash equilibria. At the same time our research broadens the understanding of asymptotic
stability beyond Ritzberger and Weibull (1996) because our analysis allows for non-convex
sets of equilibria which arise in simple applications (see Section 2.2).
Our results are also of relevance for recent research on the relation between the de-
gree and the index of equilibrium components (see, for instance, Govindan and Wilson
(1997) and DeMichelis and Germano (2000)). DeMichelis and Ritzberger (2000) show for
asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium components that their degree must equal their
Euler characteristic. They show, moreover, that the component must contain a strategi-
cally stable set as de¯ned in Mertens (1989) if the Euler characteristic is not zero.2 In
the case of the standard replicator dynamic the asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium
components are, by Theorem 12 of this paper, precisely the connected SE sets. This
means that a SE set with a non-zero Euler characteristic contains a strategically stable
set. Because a SE set is a union of faces its Euler characteristic is easy to calculate.
In Section 2 the basic concepts and terminology are introduced. Section 3 contains
our results and some examples illustrating the necessity of our assumptions. Section 4
2Notice that this condition is much weaker than requiring the component to be convex or contractible,
which is a crucial assumption in Swinkels (1993).
3concludes. The appendix shows that our results do not extend to asymmetric playing-
the-¯eld models.
2 Concepts
Except where indicated, we use the notations and de¯nitions in Ritzberger and Weibull
(1996).
2.1 Games
For a (¯nite) a normal form game ¡ the ¯nite set of players is denoted by N = f1;2;::: ;ng.
Si is the ¯nite set consisting of the Ki pure strategies sk
i, k = f1;2;::: ;Kig, of player
i 2 N. S = £i2NSi is the set of pure strategy combinations with generic element










. ¢ = £i2N¢i is the set of mixed strategy com-
binations with generic element ¾ = (¾1;¾2;::: ;¾2). Pure strategies sk
i are identi¯ed with
the corresponding unit vectors ek
i 2 ¢i. The support of a mixed strategy ¾i 2 ¢i is de-
noted by supp(¾i) =
©
sk
i 2 Si j¾k
i > 0
ª
. Let supp(¾) := £i2N supp(¾i). The face F(¾i)
generated by the mixed strategy ¾i is de¯ned as the set of all strategies ¾0
i with the same
support as ¾i. The face generated by the strategy combination ¾ is F(¾) := £i2NF(¾i).
A face of ¢ is a face generated by some ¾ 2 ¢. The mapping u : S !Rn de¯nes the payo®
for pure strategy combinations. The multilinear expected payo® function U : ¢ ! Rn and
the mixed best reply correspondence ~ ¯ = £i2N~ ¯i : ¢ ! ¢ are de¯ned in the usual manner.
The pure best reply correspondence ¯ = £i2N¯i : ¢ ! S is de¯ned by ¯ (¾) = ~ ¯ (¾)\S.
A set W ½ ¢ is closed under better replies if ¾ 2 W; ½ 2 ¢ and Ui (¾¡i;½i) ¸ Ui (¾)
for all i implies ½ 2 W: Ritzberger and Weibull (1996) call a convex set W closed under
pure better replies if the same holds with respect to all pure strategy combinations ½.
2.2 Strict equilibrium sets
De¯nition 1 i) A non-empty subset G ½ ¢ is a strict equilibrium set (SE set) if
for all ¾ 2 G and all ¿i 2 ¢i the inequality
Ui (¾¡i;¿i) · Ui(¾)
holds whereby equality implies (¾¡i;¿i) 2 G.
Notice that a SE set consists of Nash equilibria. Moreover, a singleton set f¾g is a SE
set if and only if ¾ is a strict equilibrium point.
The following lemma generalizes the observation that every strict equilibrium point is
a pure strategy combination.
Lemma 2 For every strategy combination ¾ in a SE set G the face F(¾) is contained in
G. In particular, G is a ¯nite union of faces and hence closed.
4Proof. By induction. For j = 1;::: ;n + 1 de¯ne
Fj := (£i<jF(¾i)) £ f(¾i;::: ;¾n)g.







2 Fj is in G and hence a Nash-equilibrium point. Since
¾j is a best reply to ¾0, every strategy in the support of ¾j and hence every strategy
¾0







2 G for every
¾0
j 2 F(¾j), i.e. Fj+1 ½ G. We conclude F(¾) = Fn+1 ½ G.
The following proposition is technically the core result in Balkenborg (1994):












holds for all ½ 2 V (¾) whereby equality occurs if and only if ½ is in the SE set.
Corollary 4 A SE set is a union of closed Nash equilibrium components.
Proof. Let G be a SE set. G is closed by the lemma. For each ¾ 2 G we have to
¯nd a neighborhood V (¾) such that all Nash equilibria in this neighborhood are in G.
Choose V (¾) as described in the previous proposition. Suppose ½ is a Nash equilibrium











since ½ is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore inequality (1) holds with equality and hence ½ is
in G.
The following corollary helps to compare our results with those of Ritzberger and
Weibull (1996).
Corollary 5 The following statements are equivalent:
(i) G is a convex SE set.
(ii) G is a face F(¾) that is a SE set.
(iii) G is a face F(¾) consisting of Nash equilibria that is closed under pure better
replies.
(iv) G is a Nash equilibrium component closed under better replies.
Proof. A union of faces is convex if and only if it is face. Therefore (i) and (ii) are
equivalent.
Suppose that F(¾) = £i2NF(¾i) is a SE set. Suppose that ¿ 2 F(¾), ½ 2 ¢ and that
Ui (¿¡i;½i) ¸ Ui (¿i) for all i 2 N. Then ½ 2 ~ ¯ (¿), since ¿ is a Nash equilibrium, and ¡
½¡i;¿i
¢
2 £i2NF(¾i) for all i 2 N since F(¾) is a SE set. Therefore ¿i 2 F(¾i) for all
5i 2 N. Thus (ii) implies (iii) and, since F(¾) is a Nash equilibrium component by the
previous corollary, (ii) implies (iv).






= Ui (¿) for all pure strategies sk
i in the support of ½i. Since F(¾) is
closed under better replies, sk
i 2 supp(¾i) and hence (¿¡i;½i) 2 F(¾). Therefore iii)
implies ii).
Suppose ¯nally that G satis¯es (iv). Then G is clearly a SE set and hence a union of
faces. Suppose that F(¾) is a face contained in G that is not a proper subset of another
face contained in G. Suppose ½ 2 ~ ¯ (¿) for ¿ 2 F(¾). Then 1
2½ + 1
2¿ 2 ~ ¯ (¿). The













by the choice of ¾ and hence ½ 2 F(¾). It follows in particular that F(¾) is a SE set and
hence a Nash equilibrium component by the previous corollary. Hence F(¾) = G, so (iv)
implies (ii).
We now provide some examples of SE sets. It is easy to see that the set of all Pareto-
e±cient Nash equilibria in a common interest game as de¯ned in Aumann and Sorin
(1989) is a SE set. Similarly, the set of mixed strategy combinations maximimizing the
potential in a weighted potential game as de¯ned in Monderer and Shapley (1996) is a
SE set. The following game analyzed in van Damme (1989) using forward induction does
not belong to one of these two classes of games. Consider the repeated game where the






The repeated game has two connected SE sets. One consists of all strategy combinations
inducing the play ((T;L);(B;R)), the other consists of all strategy combinations inducing
the play ((B;R);(T;L)). It is immediate to verify that these two sets are indeed SE sets.
To verify that there are no other SE sets (except for the union of the two sets) one uses
that every SE set must contain a pure Nash equilibrium. Suppose, for instance, that a SE
Set would contain a pure strategy equilibrium (¾1;¾2) inducing the play ((T;L);(T;L)).
Consider the strategy ¿1 of player 1 where he plays T in the ¯rst period and in the second
period T after the history (T;L) and B after any other history. ¿1 is a best reply to ¾2
and hence (¿1;¾2) must be in the SE set. However, ¾2 is not a best reply against ¿1:
Player 2 receives 1+1 with ¾2 while he would receive 0+3 if he would play R in the ¯rst
and, regardless of the history, R in the second period. So there can be no SE set of the
type assumed. Similarly, one checks all remaining possibilities. (For more on SE sets in
repeated games see Balkenborg (1995)).
To provide an interesting example of a game with a non-convex SE set we consider
the following action commitment game discussed in van Damme and Hurkens (1996).






is played in two stages as follows: In the ¯rst stage each player may either wait or commit
himself to one of his two actions in the coordination game. These ¯rst stage decisions
are made simultaneously and independently. At the beginning of the second stage both
players are informed which commitments, if any, have been made. If there are players who
have not committed themselves in the ¯rst stage, they must then, again simultaneously
and independently, choose one of their two actions. At the end of the second stage
both players have selected one of their two actions of the coordination game, either by
committing themselves or by choosing later, and they receive the corresponding payo®s.
This action commitment game (and, obviously, also the stage game on which it is
based) is a game with identical interests, i.e., both players have identical payo®s in each
strategy combination. Therefore it is a common interest game (or a potential game) and
hence the set of all strategy combinations where both players receive the payo® 3 is a SE
set. Moreover, it is easily seen to be the only SE set in the action commitment game.3
Suppose, for instance, that player 1 commits himself to the action B and that this is part
of a strategy combination in the SE set. A possible best reply of player 2 is to wait and
to play in the second stage L if player 1 committed himself to T and to play R otherwise.
Player 1's strategy together with player 2's best reply would have to be in the SE set,
although it is not a Nash equilibrium.
In this example the SE set is not convex. After eliminating weakly dominated strate-
gies in the reduced normal form of the action commitment game one is left with a 4 £ 4-
game with the payo®s
3 3 3 0
3 3 3 0
3 3 0 1
3 3 0 1
3 0 1 1
3 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
where the set of strategy combinations yielding payo® 3 is clearly not convex.
In the previous example the SE set is not convex, but it is still contractible. However,
SE sets can also be non-contractible cyles. An example can be found in Hofbauer and
Sigmund (1998), Section 8.6, where the asymptotically stable set for " = 0 is a SE set.
3This observation extends to any action commitment game based on a common-interest game.
72.3 Dynamics







i, 8k = 1;::: ;Ki; 8i 2 N
with Lipschitz continuous functions fi : ¢ ! R for i 2 N satisfying
P
k fi(¾) ¢ ¾k
i = 0
for all ¾ 2 ¢. We consider only regular selection dynamics in this paper and often write
brie°y \dynamic" when we mean a regular selection dynamic. For every ¾0 2 ¢ the
system of di®erential equations has a unique solution f¾tgt¸0 ½ ¢ starting in ¾0. This
trajectory satis¯es supp(¾t) = supp(¾0) for all t ¸ 0. In particular, faces of ¢ are
invariant under the dynamic.
De¯nition 6 A regular selection dynamic reinforces best replies if the following




i 2 ¯i (¾) implies fk
i (¾) ¸ 0,
b) sk
i 2 ¯i (¾) and ¾i = 2 ~ ¯ (¾) imply fk
i (¾) > 0,
c) sk
i = 2 ¯i (¾) and ¾i 2 ~ ¯ (¾) imply fk
i (¾) < 0.
Notice that for non-trivial games a) is a consequence of b) and the continuity of the fk
i .
Condition (c) is a weak condition on what happens to non-best replies. It requires for a
given population in which only best replies are played that non best replies yield negative
growth rates. In the terminology of Ritzberger and Weibull (1996), any payo® positive
selection dynamic and any sign preserving selection dynamic reinforces best replies. How-
ever, not every a weakly sign-preserving dynamics reinforces best replies. While these
di®erences exist in theory, any explicitly formulated regular selection dynamics known to
us in the literature either satis¯es our conditions or is not even weakly sign preserving.
The standard replicator dynamic is de¯ned by fk






¾ 2 ¢ is a rest point if _ ¾k
i = 0 for all i 2 N and 1 · k · Ki. Under a dynamic that
reinforces best replies, any Nash equilibrium is a rest point, but the converse does not
have to be true.
A set is forward invariant if all trajectories starting in this set remain in this set.
Consider a non-empty closed set. The set is (Lyapunov) stable if for every neighborhood
of the set trajectories starting su±ciently close to the set stay in this neighborhood.
The set is an attractor if it has a neighborhood such that all !-limit points of trajectories
starting in the neighborhood are in the set. The set is asymptotically stable if it stable and
an attractor. ¾ 2 ¢ is (asymptotically) stable if the singleton set f¾g is (asymptotically)
stable.
3 Results
For a regular selection dynamic reinforcing best replies any asymptotically stable set
containing a pure strategy combination is a strict equilibrium. Our ¯rst result generalizes
this observation to components of rest points.
8Theorem 7 For a regular selection dynamic reinforcing best replies any closed and con-
nected asymptotically stable set of rest points containing a pure strategy combination is a
SE set.
In the proof below, the pure strategy combination acts like a virus spreading the
properties of a SE set within the asymptotically stable set ¯rst to faces containing it,
then to adjacent faces and so on until the entire asymptotically stable set is covered. Let
s be the pure strategy combination and let ½i be a pure best reply for player i: The fact
that the set, say G; is asymptotically stable and only contains rest points implies that
Ui (s¡i;½i) = Ui(s) and hence the convex hull of s and (s¡i;½i) is contained in G.
Proof. Let R be the given asymptotically stable set of rest points and let G be the
union of faces contained in the set. We claim that G is a strict equilibrium set equal to
R. Since R contains at least one pure strategy combination, G is not empty. Let F be a
face contained in R.
Step 1: We show ¯rst that every strategy combination ¾ 2 F is a Nash equilibrium.
Otherwise we could ¯nd a best reply sk







i (¾) > 0 because best replies are reinforced. Since faces are invariant under
the dynamic we can assume without loss of generality that sk
i is the only strategy in the
game not belonging to F. By continuity we can choose a neighborhood V (¾) of ¾ and
a constant c > 0 such that fk
i (½) > c holds for all ½ in a some neighborhood V (¾) of





. Using Lipschitz continuity and the fact that F








i (½) holds for all pure
strategies sl
j 6= sk
i with some constant L > 0 in a neighborhood of ¾, which we can assume
again to be V (¾). Hence one can construct a neighborhood V 0 (¾) ½ V (¾) such that any
trajectory starting in V 0 (¾)nF moves to a point in V (¾) with ½k
i ¸ ®, where ® > 0 is a
constant.4 Because R is stable it has a forward invariant neighborhood W contained in





. However, any trajectory starting in (V 0 (¾)nF)\W





, which yields a contradiction.
Step 2: Suppose now that Ui(¾¡i;½i) = Ui (¾) for some ¾ 2 F and i 2 N. We can
assume i = 1 without loss of generality. For each pure strategy combination s 2 supp(¾)












£ (£2·i·jF(¾i)) £ (£j<i fsig)
We prove by induction on j that all faces Fj
s are contained in R and hence that (¾¡1;½1) 2
F n
s ½ G.













since s 2 F is a Nash equilibrium by Step 1. Since U1 (¾¡1;½1) = U1 (¾)





= U1 (s) for all s 2 supp(¾)
and sk






= U1 (¾0) and hence ½0









Each face F 1
s is invariant under the dynamic with the opponent's behavior ¯xed at
s¡i. Because the dynamic reinforces best replies it follows from the previous argument
4We skip the detailed arguments for the last two statements because they are similar to, although
simpler than, the arguments in the proof of Theorem 10.
9that fk
1 (¾0) = 0 for all sk
1 2 supp(¾1) [ supp(½1) and ¾0 2 F 1
s . Therefore F 1
s consists of
rest points. Since s 2 F1
s \ R and since R is a closed asymptotically stable set of rest
points we must have F 1
s ½ R. (Otherwise there would be rest points arbitrarily close to
R which are not contained in R.)
Now let j ¸ 2 and suppose F j¡1
s ½ R for all s 2 supp(¾). By Step 1 each F j¡1
s is a










j) is a Nash equilibrium for
all sh
j 2 supp(¾j). Therefore each ½j 2 F(¾j) is a best reply to ¾0. For each player i 6= j
¾0














s is a set of Nash equilibria and therefore a set of rest points contained in R.
Step 2 implies that G is a SE set. It remains to show that G = R. For ¾ 2 R we
can ¯nd a neighborhood V (¾) such that supp(¾) ½ supp(½) for all ½ 2 V (¾) and such




= Ui (½) for all








i2N Ui (½) and ½ 2 G. Since G is
compact and R a connected set of rest points we conclude G = R.5
Since every Nash equilibrium is a rest point, we obtain
Corollary 8 For a regular selection dynamic reinforcing best replies, any any asymptot-
ically stable Nash equilibrium component containing a pure strategy combination is a SE
set.
Theorem 7 requires the asymptotically stable set of rest points to contain a pure
strategy combination. This requirement is necessary because a set consisting of a single
Nash equilibrium in completely mixed strategies can be asymptotically stable, although
it is not a SE set. An example is the mixed strategy equilibrium of the game \match-
ing pennies" which is asymptotically stable under the adjusted replicator dynamics (see
Maynard Smith (1982), Appendix J, or Weibull (1995), p. 199®) and under sophisticated
imitation dynamics (Hofbauer and Schlag (2000)).
The restriction to regular selection dynamics is also crucial. This assumption rules out
important dynamics as the best reply dynamics, ¯ctitious play or the dynamics discussed
in (DeMichelis and Ritzberger (2000)) which have exactly the Nash equilibria as ¯xed
points. To see why, consider the simple 2£2 game in Figure 1. The best reply dynamics
(see e.g. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) for this game is
_ x1 = 0
_ x2 = ¡x2:
where x1 = prob(B), x2 = prob(R). The set G = fx1 = 0g [ fx2 = 0g is an asymptoti-
cally stable set for this dynamics. In contrast, for a regular selection dynamic reinforcing
best replies all points on the line segment fx2 = 1g would be rest points and consequently
G would not be a closed asymptotically stable set of rest points.
5Note that G = R can be deduced for the special case of two-player games without using Proposition










Figure 1: For regular selection dynamics reinforcing best replies the set of rest
points in this example is the union of the line segments AB, BC and CD.
We can prove a converse statement to Theorem 7 only under an additional restriction
that is, however, always satis¯ed in the case of two-player games or for convex SE sets. It
is also satis¯ed for the cyclical, non-convex SE set of the three-player game in Hofbauer
and Sigmund (1998), Section 8.6, with " = 0:
Lemma 9 Suppose G is a SE set in a two-player game or a convex SE set. Then G
satis¯es the property:
¾ 2 G and ½ 2 ~ ¯ (¾) implies ¾ 2 ~ ¯ (½) (*)
Proof. Consider ¾ 2 G and ½ 2 ~ ¯ (¾): Assume that there are only two players. Then
(¾¡i;½i) 2 G for i = 1;2 and hence ¾ 2 ~ ¯ (½): Alternatively, assume that G is convex.
Then Corollary 5 implies that G is a face, that ½ 2 G and hence that ¾ 2 ~ ¯ (½):
Theorem 10 Every SE set satisfying (*) is an asymptotically stable set of Lyapunov
stable rest points for any regular selection dynamic reinforcing best replies.
In order to outline the idea of the proof we consider the dynamics restricted to the
invariant subset ~ ¯ (¾) where ¾ is an element of the SE set G: As best replies are reinforced,
(*) implies that the frequency of every pure strategy in the support of ¾ cannot decrease
over time on this invariant subspace. This implies that ¾ is Lyapunov stable on ~ ¯ (¾).
In the case where the dynamics is di®erentiable linearization around ¾ shows that all
di®erence vectors ¿ ¡ ¾ with ¿ 2 ~ ¯ (¾) are Eigenvectors to the Eigenvalue 0 while every
pure strategy which is not a best reply to ¾ generates an Eigenvector with a real and
negative Eigenvalue. It follows that ~ ¯ (¾) is a center manifold. Under this circumstances
it is well-known (see e.g, Arnold, Afrajmovich, Il'yashenko, and Shilnikov (1999)) that
Lyapunov stability on ~ ¯ (¾) implies Lyapunov stability for the unrestricted dynamic.
However, we do not want to assume di®erentiabilty and hence give a direct proof. To
show asymptotic stability of the SE set one needs that there are no rest points close to
the sets. This can easily be shown for two-player games. Otherwise one has to rely on
Proposition 3.
11Proof. Fix a strategy combination ¾ in the SE set G and let F(¾) = £iF(¾i) µ G
be the face generated by ¾.






















dt = _ ° (½t) holds along every trajectory f½tg: Since the dynamic
reinforces best replies we have fk
i (¾) < 0 for all sk
i = 2 ¯i (¾). Because each fk
i (¾) is
continuous there exists a constant c > 0 such that fk
i (½) < ¡c holds for all i 2 N and all
sk
i = 2 ¯i (¾) in a su±ciently small neighborhood of ¾. Therefore
_ ° (½) · ¡c° (½) · 0 (2)
holds in this neighborhood. Since the dynamic is Lipschitz continuous we can ¯nd a



























holds for all ½;¿ 2 ¢ su±ciently close to ¾. We can represent each component ½i of ½ 2 ¢
as a convex combination ½i = (1 ¡ ¸i)¿i+¸iºi where 0 · ¸i · 1, ¿i 2 ~ ¯i (¾) and ºi 2 ¢i,











¯ ¯ = 2
X
i2N
¸i = 2° (½). (3)
Assumption (*) implies for ¿ = (¿i)i2N 2 ~ ¯ (¾) that each sk
i 2 supp(¾i); i 2 N, is a best
reply to ¿. Hence fk
























¯ ¯ = 2L° (½):










i 2 supp(¾i); i 2 N, and all ½ su±ciently close to ¾.




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯




c ° (½) ¡ 2L
c ± for all i 2 N, sk
i 2 supp(¾i)
¾
form for varying ± > 0 a basis of open neighborhoods of ¾.6 These neighborhoods are
forward invariant for all su±ciently small ± > 0: Let f½(t)gt¸0 be a trajectory with






for some constant a > 0.
12½(0) 2 V± (¾). Let T > 0 be the ¯rst time where the trajectory leaves V± (¾). We must
have ° (½(T)) < ± since _ ° (½) · 0 holds for all ½ in the neighborhood. Moreover, for all
sk
i 2 supp(¾i), i 2 N,
½
k














_ ° (½(t))dt =
2L
c





















so that ½(T) 2 V± (¾), a contradiction.
In particular, ¾ is Lyapunov stable. In order to show that G is asymptotically stable
we show for all su±ciently small ± > 0 that all trajectories f½(t)gt¸0 starting in V± (¾)
have !-limit points only in G. Let ^ ½ be a limit point of the trajectory. ° (½(t)) is
decreasing along the trajectory and hence (see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) Theorem
2.6.1) _ ° (^ ½) = 0. Because _ ° (½) < 0 for all ½ 2 V± (¾)n~ ¯ (¾) we conclude ^ ½ 2 ~ ¯ (¾) and
therefore that fk
i (^ ½) ¸ 0 holds for all i 2 N and sk
i 2 supp(¾) µ supp(^ ½). If fk
i (^ ½) > 0
then ½k
i (t) would be increasing for large t. Again using Theorem 2.6.1 in Hofbauer and
Sigmund (1998) we would obtain the contradiction ^ ½
k
ifk
i (^ ½) = 0 with ^ ½
k
i 6= 0. Hence
fk
i (^ ½) = 0 for all i 2 N and sk
i 2 supp(¾). Since each sk
i 2 supp(¾) is a best reply




= Ui (^ ½) for
all i 2 N. Therefore, if we have chosen V± (¾) such that Proposition 3 applies, we can
conclude that ¾ 2 G.7
The following example is an SE set in a 2 £ 2 £ 2-game not satisfying Property (*).
We construct a dynamics where not all strategy combinations in the set are Lyapunov
stable.
Let x1 = prob(D); x2 = prob(R) and x3 = prob(B).
The set G = fx1 = 1g [ fx3 = 1g is a SE set of the game in Figure 2 which does not
satisfy property (*). For instance, (U;L;T) is a best reply to (D;L;B) 2 G, but (D;R;B)
is the unique best reply to (U;L;T).
Consider the following payo® monotonic dynamic:
_ x1 = x1 (1 ¡ x1)(1 ¡ x3)
2
_ x2 = x2 (1 ¡ x2)(1 ¡ x1)(1 ¡ x3)
_ x3 = x3 (1 ¡ x3)(1 ¡ x1)
2
It is obtained from the standard replicator equations by squaring the terms (1 ¡ x3) and,
respectively, (1 ¡ x1) in the equations for _ x1 and _ x3 so that the speed of a trajectory in
the x1 and x3 direction is slowed down while the speed in the x2 direction is unaltered. It
is not di±cult to see that G is an asymptotically stable set of rest points. We claim that
the points (1;x2;1) 2 G with x2 < 1 are not Lyapunov stable for x2 < 1.
7In the case of two-player games one can directly argue as follows: Since ^ ½ 2 ~ ¯ (¾) we have (^ ½1;¾2) 2 G.
But then U2 (^ ½1;¾2) = U2 (^ ½) means that ^ ½2 is a best reply to (^ ½1;¾2) and hence ^ ½ = (^ ½1;^ ½2) 2 G.
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Figure 2: A game with an SE set not satisfying Property (*) where not all Nash
equilibria are Lyapunov stable.
By symmetry, the plane fx1 = x3g is invariant. Consider any trajectory x(t) starting
in the relative interior of this plane. Then limt!1 x1 (t) = limt!1x3 (t) = 1: Separation
of variables shows that
x2 (t) =
cx1 (t)
1 ¡ x1 (t) + cx1 (t)
holds for an appropriate constant c > 0: Therefore, limt!1x2 (t) = 1: Thus we can ¯nd
trajectories starting arbitrarily close to any (1;x2;1) which converge to (1;1;1).
We do not know whether an a SE set not satisfying Property (*) is always asymp-
totically stable. If this were true, multilinearity of the payo® functions would have to be
essential in a proof. Without multilinearity asymptotic stability does not have to hold,
as we show in the appendix.
Bringing together Theorem 7 and Theorem 10 we obtain:
Corollary 11 Consider a regular selection dynamic reinforcing best replies and a closed
and connected set G containing at least one pure strategy combination. Suppose that there
are only two players or that G is convex. Then G is an asymptotically stable set of rest
points if and only if G is a strict equilibrium set.
The strongest result can be obtained for the standard replicator dynamic (the \if"
statement here is due to Balkenborg (1994)):
14Theorem 12 A non-empty and closed set is an asymptotically stable set of rest points
under the standard replicator dynamics if and only if it is a strict equilibrium set.
Proof. Suppose G is an asymptotically stable set of rest points. Because the standard
replicator dynamic is volume preserving, every connected component of G contains a pure
strategy combination (see Ritzberger and Weibull (1996), Proposition 6). By Proposition
7 every connected component of G is a SE set. Since the union of SE sets is a SE set, G















for ¾ 2 G it is straightforward to show that a SE set is an asymptotically stable set of
stable rest points for the standard replicator dynamics (see Balkenborg (1994) for details).
4 Conclusion
Static game theoretic concepts as necessary or su±cient conditions for dynamic stability
are extremely useful because explicit dynamics are often di±cult to handle. The concept of
an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) has been popular as it is su±cient for asymptotic
stability under the replicator dynamics in single population contests. As ESS often do
not exist, set-valued generalizations such as that of an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES Set,
Thomas (1985)) have been proposed (see also Balkenborg and Schlag (2000) and Weibull
(1995)). In multi-population contests based on normal form games, a population state
has to be a strict equilibrium point in order to be asymptotically stable for a large variety
of evolutionary dynamics. A strict equilibrium is hence the counterpart of an ESS for this
setting. Similar to ESS, strict equilibria often fail to exist, in particular in extensive-form
games.
Hence Balkenborg (1994) introduces the set-valued concept of a SE set which is a
generalization of a strict equilibrium in the same spirit as an ES Set generalizes an ESS.
In his unpublished manuscript Balkenborg shows that SE Sets are asymptotically stable
under the multi-population standard replicator dynamic. Doing this he uncovers the
observation stated in Proposition 3 that we build on in the proof of Proposition 10.8 We
complement his research by showing, conversely, that only SE Sets can be asymptotically
stable under this dynamic.
Both in the single- and the multi-population setting Swinkels (1992) has proposed
alternative notions for the evolutionary stability of sets called equilibrium evolutionarily
stable sets (EES sets). Their dynamic interpretation is, however, far from obvious. For
symmetric two-player games Balkenborg and Schlag (2000) show that every ES set is a
EES set. Using their results and those in Balkenborg (1994) it is not di±cult to show
that every connected SE set of a two-player game is a EES set as de¯ned by Swinkels in
the two-population setting.
8For two player games our main ¯ndings are, however, independent of his his results.
15The standard replicator dynamic is a particularly important example of a regular
selection dynamic as it results from many di®erent models of individual learning or imi-
tation (see, e.g., Borgers and Sarin (1997), Gale, Binmore, and Samuelson (1995), Schlag
(1998)). But alternative regular selection dynamics have emerged from individual learning
models (e.g., Schlag (1999), Hofbauer and Schlag (2000)) and the theoretical analysis has
focused on properties which hold in general classes of such dynamics (see, e.g., Samuelson
and Zhang (1992), Ritzberger and Weibull (1996)). In this paper we investigate a broad
class of regular selection dynamics that covers both sign-preserving and payo® positive
dynamics and incorporates all explicit regular selection dynamics we have found in the
literature. We show that the SE set concept is closely linked to asymptotic stability for
such dynamics. It is hence an important tool for analyzing evolutionary dynamics in
asymmetric games.
While this paper is more concerned with the development of tools than with immediate
applications we obtain direct implications in two examples. It follows that the forward
induction outcome for the twice repeated battle-of-the-sexes game determined in van
Damme (1989) is asymptotically stable under a wide variety of evolutionary dynamics.
The same holds for the set of e±cient equilibria in an action commitment game studied by
van Damme and Hurkens (1996). Because we do not restrict attention to convex sets of
strategy combinations our approach yields stability results directly for the set of e±cient
equilibria whereas the solution set identi¯ed by van Damme and Hurkens (1996) also
contains ine±cient strategy combinations which are not even Nash equilibria. For further
applications of SE sets we refer to Balkenborg (1995) for repeated games and to Schlag
(1994) for cheap talk games.
Our paper complements the ¯ndings of Ritzberger and Weibull (1996) who study
the asymptotic stability for faces while we are concerned with the asymptotic stability
of components of rest points containing a pure strategy combination. It is natural to
concentrate on (components of) rest points because they describe states where learning or
evolution has come to a stand-still. However, our analysis says little about asymptotically
stable interior rest points or components of rest points. Here we refer to Hofbauer and
Hopkins (2000) who obtain necessary and su±cient conditions for the asymptotic stability
of interior Nash equilibria in two-player games under perturbed best reponse dynamics.
These are, of course, not regular selection dynamics.
For sign-preserving as well as many other dynamics rest points are Nash equilibria
in the game restricted to strategies in the support of this rest point. Thus it is not
too surprising that the asymptotically stable sets of rest points we consider turn out to
be Nash equilibrium components. A more interesting ¯nding in this context is that all
elements of a convex asymptotically stable set of rest points containing a pure strategy
combination are necessarily Lyapunov stable. As we demonstrate in Section 3 (see Figure
3) this is not necessarily true when the asymptotically stable set is not convex. The
di±culties revealed by this example and by the negative result in the appendix are also
the reason why our analysis remains unsatisfactory for games with more than two players.
We do not know whether Theorem 10 continues to hold without assuming Property (*).
For several important classes of extensive-form games components of rest points can
only be asymptotically stable with respect to trajectories starting in the interior of the
space of mixed strategy combinations (see, e.g., Cressman (1996), Cressman and Schlag
16(1997) and Binmore and Samuelson (1994)). Our restriction to components which are
asymptotically stable with respect to all trajectories is hence severe. It is an open question
whether a general game theoretic characterisation of components which are asymptotically
stable in the weaker sense is feasible.
A An Example for playing the ¯eld models
It is an open question whether SE sets which do not satisfy property (*) are stable for
any dynamic reinforcing best replies. If so, this must be due to the multilinearity of
the expected payo® function for a normal form game. As shown for the example below,
once we allow for the possibility that the expected payo® function is not multilinear
in the opponent's mixed strategies SE sets do not have to be asymptotically stable or
even Lyapunov stable. Such games are of interest as they constitute the n-population
analogue of playing the ¯eld models based on a single population (see Maynard Smith
(1982) and Hammerstein and Selten (1994)). A detailed study of such models can be
found in Cressman (1992). Nash equilibria, SE sets etc. are still de¯ned for these games.
Consider the 2 £ 2 £ 2 playing-the-¯eld model with the payo® functions
Ui (x1;x2;x3) := xi (xj ¡ a(xj + xk))(xk ¡ a(xj + xk))
where 1
2 · a < 1 and where (i;j;k) is a permutation of (1;2;3). The game is not
multilinear because the utility depends quadratically on xj and on xk. The set G consisting
of the three line segments Li := fxj = xk = 0g, i 2 f1;2;3g is a SE set. For a = 1
2 the
diagonal ± = f(x;x;x) j0 · x · 1g consists of Nash equilibria. G is not a closed isolated
equilibrium component since G \ ± = f(0;0;0)g. In particular G is not asymptotically
stable under the standard replicator dynamic. For a > 1
2 G is not even stable. It has a






Figure 3: The SE set described is here indicated by the line segments AB, AC and
AD.
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